Why a third Greek bailout is a bad idea

Published on ZeroHedge 

Last Sunday, Eurozone countries submitted yet another ultimatum to Greece: implement a whole round of reforms, from eliminating early retirement over scrapping exemptions from sales tax to opening shops on Sunday, and we’ll start negotiations on providing a new bailout of possibly €86bn from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the Eurozone’s bailout scheme, which will carry yet another series of strings attached. Hereunder are four reasons why this whole thing is just a bad idea. 

1.      The previous two bailouts have failed. Why try more of the same?

Today, Greek debt to GDP has reached 180%, an all time high. It should come as no surprised that an overindebted country’s economy will shrink when it is being burdened with even more debt. This happened from 2010 on, when the country received “emergency loans” amounting to an estimated 240 billion euro, both from Eurozone countries and the IMF. At the instigation of former French IMF chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the IMF violated its own principles by not allowing Greece to default on major international banks before granting it a loan. It now is facing heavy losses, after Greece has already defaulted twice on an IMF payment now or is “in arrears”, in IMF-lingo. Also the “no-bailout rule” in the EU Treaty was violated.

It’s true that this therefore was a bailout of major international banks who had been lending to Greece, as we have pointed out back then with Open Europe. Still also Greece profited, as someone else really paid back part of the funds which they had been enjoying previously. 

Greece hasn’t properly implemented all the measures it promised take. The IMF has stated that “only 5 of 12 planned IMF reviews under the current program were completed, and only one has been completed since mid-2013, because of the failure to implement reforms”. Greece did restore some competitiveness, but would probably have benefited more if it had reformed more. Still, many of the measures from these bailout programmes, including the newly proposed one, involve tax hikes. How this can drive economic growth in a country already crippled with debt is anyone’s guess.

2.      It’s toxic to intervene deeply into the political decisions of another country

Greece was never really forced to join the euro, given that it didn’t comply with the entry requirements in the first place. It is also free to leave the Eurozone, as the newly proposed deal for Greece looks like an invitation for the country to do so. Isn’t then all the criticism towards Germany and the other Eurozone states of having the temerity to attach some strings to providing another €86bn in  taxpayers' money a bit rich?

Yes it is, and we should also blame the Greek government for inviting foreign intervention by applying for yet another bailout, but that doesn’t take away the fact that this is the recipe for radicalizing public opinion. When a large majority of Greeks, 61%, rejects a set of conditions attached to a possible new bailout in a referendum, surely should rather be not to seek a new bailout, and seek Grexit, instead of seeking one with even more stringent proposals? Former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis has warned that the Greek fascist “Golden Dawn” party could “inherit the mantle of the anti-austerity drive, tragically”, now that the hard left Syriza formation has basically backed down to foreign demands. We shouldn’t ignore this danger.

3. More transfers and common Eurozone decision making leads to conflict 

Whereas until now the Greek crisis mainly soured relations between Germany and Greece, luckily mostly between its politicians and media, it has now lead to an open split between Germany and France, with the latter pushing for more money for Greece and the former openly suggesting “Grexit”. A country like Belgium, infamous for its tensions between the Germanic and Francophone part of the country, which only four years ago led to the inability to form a new federal government for one and a half year, should be sufficient proof that a lack of common “public opinion”, “demos” or “culture” can hugely complicate and even toxify decision making. 

Regardless of whether the more “ordoliberal” Germanics or the “socialist” Southern Europeans are right or wrong: given the intensity of the criticism of the conditions suggested by Germany for the new Greek bailout, one can only wonder how big the tensions would be in case the Eurozone would further centralize power and increase the size of the transfers. Still the so-called Five Presidents' Report” written by the heads of the EU institutions is proposing just that. You wouldn't expect them to suggest anything else, but does this make sense to anyone outside of the EU bubble? 

4. Propping up the Eurozone endangers the EU

The Franco-German tensions we’re witnessing are very problematic. The EU really is built on a grand diplomatic deal between these two countries and the core of the EU project really is about reducing trade barriers, thereby securing lasting peace through trade in Europe. Everything else the EU has undertaken depends on the legitimacy it has obtained due to the success of removing trade barriers: from good projects, as the passport- free zone Schengen or the free movement of people, to questionable projects, as the common currency, the ever growing set of burdensome regulations or the wasteful 1 trillion euro EU Budget, to vanity projects, as the invisible EU Diplomatic Service. Now the most unsuccessful side-project of the EU, the common currency, may one day trouble the EU. EU-critical protest parties managed to gain almost one third of the vote in least year’s EP elections, up from only one fifth in 2009. Apart from perhaps migration, the euro has without much doubt been the prominent factor in their success.

As Finland’s Foreign Minister Timo Soini said this week about the idea of a third Greek bailout round: "the Finnish public can't understand that this is allowed to continue". 

Can anyone else?

Why Grexit is now the most likely outcome

Published on ZeroHedge

A Greek no-vote may lead to a Greek exit from the Eurozone, some EU decision makers, like Eurogroup chairman Jeroen Dijsselbloem, have warned ahead of the Greek referendum. Now that Greece overwhelmingly voted “no” and Eurozone leaders have given it an ultimatum once more, a number of factors suggest that “Grexit” may indeed be the outcome:

1.      Greece already defaulted on the IMF

Last week, Greece defaulted on the IMF, even if we technically would need to say it was put in “arrears”, as the first developed country ever. Currently, the Greek banking system is dependent on the ECB allowing the Greek Central Bank to issue loans to Greek banks through a scheme called Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). As the name suggests, this funding can only be provided to deal with a liquidity problem, so it cannot prop up insolvent banks. Greek banks are intimately linked with the insolvent Greek state, meaning they are insolvent themselves, meaning the ECB would need to cut off funding. 

The necessary two thirds majority which is needed within the ECB Governing Council to block the Greek Central Bank from creating euros to lend to Greek banks under ELA hasn’t been reached so far. As a result, the ECB has had to come up with all kinds of excuses not to do so, the latest being that it will only cut off ELA funding for Greek banks in case there is “no prospect of a deal”. The ECB’s excuses are likely to be used up soon, especially if the Greek government defaults on payments to the ECB on 20 July. This week, the ECB restrained ELA a little more, but it’s expected to provide ELA funding at least until Sunday, wanting political cover for anything it does.

Greek pensioners are meanwhile standing at the gates, so a logical outcome would be for the Greek government to pay them in “IOUs” or parallel currency, which could be used to pay for government services, for example health care, something which the former Greek Finance Minister already suggested. 

Another problem is that Greek banks are running out of actual physical bank notes, possibly by the end of this week. Closing banks is bad enough, but closing ATMs is a recipe for chaos. It would force the Greek government to print Drachmas, while uncertainty would reign during the transition period.

2.      The positions of Greece and the other Eurozone countries look further apart than ever before 

Given that Greece’s finance gap will only have grown bigger as a result of the economic damage inflicted by capital controls, Greek politicians likely will need to give in to even more “austerity” than before the talks with creditors broke down. German Chancellor Merkel stressed yesterday that Greek measures will have to “go beyond” what was demanded by the creditors before the referendum. How likely is this to happen in the face of the massive “no”- vote? Costas Lapavitsas, the leader of the radical wing of Syriza, already warned that "the referendum has its own dynamic. People will revolt if [Tsipras] comes back from Brussels with a shoddy compromise." Some Greek analysts think Tsipras doesn’t want a deal himself anyway.

It must be said that the so-called “austerity” was always more a synonym for monstrous tax hikes than for actual spending cuts. One of the recent Greek government’s proposals, was for example to unleash 2.69 billion euro in tax hikes on the Greek private sector this year – perhaps hoping the money wouldn’t be raised anyway - while only cutting spending for “pensions” – which more than often seems to mean the pension administration, not actual pension payouts - with 60 million euro. Grexit may be tough for Greece on the short term, but surely this is not a very nice alternative?

There is still a chance that Greece will back down completely in the next two days, giving up its demand for debt restructuring, which Merkel has called “out of the question”. The result of this would be that Greece would enter a new ESM programme. So far however, it looks like the Greek government hasn’t come up with detailed proposals, apart from a general request to get ESM funds, despite the fact this is needed, by Friday morning at the latest, to allow the Bundestag to sign it off. 

It’s therefore more likely that the upcoming Summit this Sunday decides to exclude the country from the Eurozone and provide funds to make the transition to Drachma through the so-called “Balance of Payments” – facility for non-euro states which has been used for Romania, Hungary and Latvia. That all EU member states will be invited to this Summit is already a sign that Grexit is likely, given that they’re legally needed to sign it off.  In any case, whatever happens next: the fact that EU Commission President Juncker declared that “We have a Grexit scenario, prepared in detail” proves for the first time that the euro is not irreversible.

3.      Capital controls are notoriously hard to unwind

Who are these people who still have deposits in Greek bank accounts, apart from pensioners who have no other choice? They exist, according to official Greek data, which reveal that there were still almost 130 billion euro in Greek deposits before the capital controls were announced, following the slow motion bank-run. If Greek banks would reopen now, who would trust they wouldn’t be closed soon after once again? 

The ECB isn’t likely to allow sufficient ELA funding for Greek banks to reopen again without a deal, while a deal itself is also unlikely. This means that if Greece ever wants to reopen its banks it will have to start printing its own currency. 

4.      The  no-vote protects the eurozone’s politicians against criticism of having pushed Greece out

Prepare for more blame games between Greece and the other Eurozone countries if the country would leave. One particular reason for Eurozone politicians not to push out Greece is that it may reflect badly on them. Now that the Greek people have sent a powerful signal that they desire a full-blown “transfer-union”, which is not on offer, it will be much harder to blame Eurozone politicians for refusing more transfers than the ones already conducted, through the ECB and bailout loans with low interest rates.

How would a Greek exit play out?

Eurozone countries could fly in periodical shipments of euro bank notes until the end of Summer, in order to avoid a risk of social breakdown. This special “transition bailout” – possibly financed by future cuts to EU subsidies for Greece - could be decided, as a means of raising hopes for an orderly transition to the Drachma or alternatively a situation in which Greece – after having defaulted and restructured its banks - uses the euro but doesn’t enjoy the cheap money from the ECB, like Montenegro. 

This would give Greece an incentive to stay in the EU – and NATO – and to play along when it is legally relegated to the “euro derogation” - status of Bulgaria, Sweden and Poland: obliged to join the eurozone but not good enough yet to join. The fact that German Finance Minister Schäuble mentioned ahead of the referendum that a Greek “no” may lead to a euro-exit which would be “temporary” may refer to this. The IMF and also European Parliament President Schulz have been making noices about “IMF assistance” and “humanitarian aid”. It looks like this is finally it.

What would happen in case of Grexit?

Published on ZeroHedge

In order to “help” Greece, since 2010, we’ve seen fiscal transfers and foreign intervention into its domestic economic policies. Greece’s debt to GDP ratio is now around 180% to GDP, while a lot of the bailout cash has merely served to bail out banks, as Open Europe already warned in 2012.

A number of policy makers now wants to try something new: a Greek exit from the Eurozone. One of them is Christian von Stetten, a Member of Germany’s Parliament and of Angela Merkel's CDU. He states what a majority of Germans believe should happen: "The experiment with the Greeks in the eurozone, who are unwilling to implement reforms, has failed and must be ended". He adds that he's in favour of providing "many billions" in support so Greece can make the transition onto its own currency.

Hereunder I explore what would happen if Greece were to leave the Eurozone, through a legal fudge.

1. Default

If Greece wouldn’t have already defaulted before it would introduce a new currency, Grexit would make it virtually certain that the country would default. It’s not wise to take out a considerable loan in a foreign currency, but that’s what Greece has done since 2001, when it entered the Eurozone. If Greece would introduce a new currency, which then likely would lose value against the euro, it would still need to pay back its debt in euro, which woud appreciate in value as compared to the new Drachma, making this task even harder.

If Greece would only pay back what it owes in a new, devalued currency, this would be considered a default. As a result, the Greek government would face higher borrowing rates in the future. In theory, the fact that it wouldn’t be burdened by an excessive 180% debt to GDP may serve as a factor countering this, giving that the financial situation of the government would look more rosy. But this ignores the second aspect of Grexit, which I’ll discuss next.

2. The Greek banking system would be cut off from the ECB’s cheap money canal, with real austerity to follow

A default would only relieve Greece from its excessive external public debt burden, not from the exposure it has to its banking system. Almost half the “capital” in the four largest Greek banks really consists of “deferred tax assets” or discounts on future tax bills. When banks make no profit, they won’t enjoy such discounts.

Moody's has estimated that at the end of April, 32% of total assets of Greek banks were derived from central bank funding. This was 12% in September and estimates put it at close to 50% today., with bank deposits at their lowest level in 11 years, below 130 billion euro. As Greeks withdraw deposits from their banks, using the money to buy hard assets like cars, whose sales have risen, the ECB still makes sure Greek banks enjoy sufficient liquidity, by allowing the Greek central bank to create euros itself through the system of “emergency liquidity assistance” (ELA), which should only be allowed to prop up solvent banks. Some five billion euros was withdrawn from Greek banks last week, with the ongoing bank run forcing the ECB to decide on increasing or maintaining the ELA – lifeline for Greek banks on a daily basis now.

The ELA loans to Greek banks are in theory a risk for the Greek central bank, and not for the ECB, but of course any new euro which wouldn’t have been created in “normal” circumstances reduces the value of the existing stock of euros, representing a transfer to those who withdrew the cash. Also those who didn’t withdraw don’t need to despair, as a Greek euro exit would signify a goodbye gift for the Greek economy, a “dowry”, as German economist Hans-Werner Sinn has put it. With Open Europe, we already warned in March that a bankrun may drive the eurozone to support capital controls, in order to stop this. In one wants to know what would happen if every central bank in the eurozone would do what the Greek central bank is doing, perhaps it's interesting to have a look at the breakup of the Ruble zone.

ELA is not the ordinary way for the ECB to shower Greek banks with liquidity. The normal way of doing business is for Greek banks to provide the ECB with - shaky - collateral, as Greek government debt, in return for cash. As a result, the ECB has been building up considerable exposure to Greece through the so-called “Target2” payment system, which makes it again less appealing to go for Grexit.

Importantly, the ECB announced in February it will – finally - no longer accept Greek government debt as collateral, forcing banks to their last resort - Emergency Liquidity Assistance. The ECB also imposes a discount on the collateral posted by Greek banks to get their ELA cash from the Greek central bank - making it harder for banks to get the cash. Will the ECB cut off funding for Greek banks if Greece defaults? An insider, quoted by Reuters, seems to think so, saying that "If Greece declared default, everything would change. It would be very hard for the ECB to authorize financing with collateral of a debtor in default."

To make a long story short: when a country enters the Eurozone, having access to the ECB’s cheap money provision is without any doubt one of the most important elements of Eurozone membership. 

That this cheap money may one day be used by the ECB to exert political influence, can be confirmed by former Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi, who was toppled by the ECB’s ability to affect Italy’s borrowing rate, according to some. The ECB now also uses it to pressure Greece into bowing to its demands, as it has been doing to Cyprus and Ireland. Perhaps Paul Krugman may not agree with it, but in the real world there is no such thing as a free lunch.

After euro-accession - or actually since it became clear they’d join the Eurozone, given the expectation effect- Greek, Italian, French, Belgian, Spanish and Irish banks were suddenly flooded with cheap money, whereas before they faced higher interest rates. As a result, investments were being made that would otherwise not have been made, with very considerable economic distortions as a result. In the case of Greece, Italy and Belgium, much of the cash went to public spending. In the case of Ireland and Spain, it went to unsustainable private spending, ending up in a gigantic real estate bubble and bust, very high private debt rates and broken banking systems which have only partially been cleaned up. The ECB could have partially countered this, for example by not gradually loosening up collateral requirements for banks to get ECB cash over the years since 2008, but at the end of the day, it was inavoidable.

If the ECB would cut off or limit funding for Greek banks to the point where the bank run couldn't be dealt with, a bank holiday would be called. Greek banks would be restructured. Shareholders would lose everything, just like bondholders, and depositors would either lose a part of their deposits or would receive them in devalued Greek currency. Parallel currency solutions may be tried, transition bailouts may be given, but in the end the cheap money party would be over.

Most analysts of Grexit are concerned about how this “Corralito”, as a similar episode in Argentina in 2001-2002 has been dubbed, would play out, but that’s not even the most risky aspect of Grexit.

The Greek state, strongly reliant on the ECB, through the Greek banking system, wouldn’t be able to pay salaries and pensions any longer. Dismissals of public servants, cuts into their salaries to Balkan-style levels, or both, would become necessary, whether Syriza would survive in power or not. To predict that this will never happen without very serious protests isn’t hard. But depending on the size of transition bailouts, it would be possible to smooth out this process over time. Those who really care about ending the clientelist system in Greece, to which Syriza may be taking part, should rejoice. In the same way that Georgia managed to reduce state corruption and boost economic growth by simply cutting the number of government workers by 50% and reducing the state's role into the economy, Greece may achieve the same success. To end Greek access to the ECB's cheap money canal may not be a sufficient condition for this to happen, but it is probably a necessary condition. Higher interest rates would secure that Greek politicians would no longer be able to burden their citizens with ever more debt.

3. Depreciation of the new Greek currency

As explained, the main problem of Greece’s Eurozone membership wasn’t so much the fact that it had an overvalued currency, but rather that the euro served as a massive debt machine for the country. Still, the country did lose a lot of competitiveness, contributing to the inability to serve its debt obligations, after it entered the euro. One must give Greece credit for having partially restored competitiveness, through labour market reform, rising 48 places in the World Bank’s Doing Business report between 2010 and 2015. Given that the currency would lose value, economic sectors like tourism may benefit, but this effect has already been partially achieved by the efforts to achieve an “internal devaluation”.

It should be noted that the introduction of a new currency may well fail. This happened in Ecuador, leading the country to adopting the US Dollar as its currency. Montenegro and Kosovo already use the euro as their currency, without their banks having access to the cheap money canal of the ECB. If the ECB cuts off Greek banks, Greece will become like Montenegro. The good part is that politicians then won't be able to abuse the printing press to fund state spending. The bad part is that Greece would need to rely on these politicians to restore competitiveness. If Greece would have its own currency, investors could just sell it off in case the country's competitiveness would be in trouble. This would impoverish the Greeks, but it would also make them cheaper to hire. It would make it cheaper to go on a holiday in Greece. It really is a trade-off then: Becoming like Montenegro or like Turkey.

4. (Long term) Contagion

The process of introducing a new currency may in theory set off immediate contagion: bank runs in Portugal, higher borrowing rates for Italy. However, the ECB can just print money in order to bail out Portugese banks and manipulate sovereign borrowing rates, through QE or other various instruments.

A more likely risk is long term contagion. Grexit would set a precedent. After Grexit, once another Eurozone state would get in trouble, much more money may be needed to assure that the country would stay in, for example Portugal. This may make it less likely that Eurozone countries would bail out Portugal, in turn raising attention to Italy and Spain, increasing the chance of a complete Eurozone break-up.

On the other hand, bailing out Greece once more also comes at a cost. It will emboldens these populists in countries like Portugal and Spain who’re hostile to the strings attached to the bailouts their countries have received or continue to receive indirectly, through the ECB's easy money canal. This in turn may make the wealthier Eurozone states, like Germany, less keen to provide more bailouts. It increases the chance of a Eurozone break-up.

Conclusion:

Regardless of whether one thinks the Eurozone should be broken up or not: if it can only survive through continuous transfers, states mingling into each other’s national policy choices, which strains once-beneficial relations between European countries, it may not be such a great idea to continue with it. Those who believe that if only we do a few more transfers, everything may turn quiet, have been trying for five years. 

There will be no calm in a transfer union which lacks sufficient political unity. But perhaps the euro can survive, without transfers. Those who believe so, and I doubt that they're right, may now try Grexit to prove their point.

Stop de Griekse schulden-carrousel

Gepubliceerd in De Standaard en FTM.nl

Onder de titel “Red Griekenland om Europa te redden”,  betoogde Timothy Garton Ash gisteren in deze krant dat de andere eurolanden Griekenland nog maar eens miljarden moeten toestoppen. Dit zal Griekenland echter niet redden. Bovendien mogen we de eurozone en de Europese Unie nooit met elkaar verwarren. Ondanks haar gebreken, heeft het Europese project de handel en dus de vrede tussen de lidstaten fors bevorderd. De Eurozone bevorderde eerder het aangaan van schulden en spanningen tussen de lidstaten. 

Zou “Grexit” een mooi spektakel zijn? Neen, maar er zijn geen schoonheidsoplossingen meer. Het zou gepaard gaan met kapitaalcontroles en het tijdelijk sluiten van banken. Het invoeren van een nieuwe munt zou tijd vergen, maar in eerste instantie zou Griekenland de euro nog kunnen gebruiken, zoals Montenegro dat doet. Dat zou betekenen dat de lokale banken geen toegang meer zouden hebben tot het goedkoop geld van de ECB. De aandeelhouders van de geherstructureerde banken zouden verliezen moeten nemen, net zoals de schuldeisers. De spaarders zouden ofwel een deel van hun geld terugkrijgen, ofwel alles, maar dan wel in de nieuwe, gedevalueerde munt.

Als Griekenland de muntunie verlaat, blijft het in de EU en krijgt het wellicht nog wat geld om de transitie te maken. Rusland zou grote moeite hebben om Griekenland te ondersteunen. De Griekse economie bedraagt 12% van de Russische economie, die lijdt onder de lagere olieprijzen. 

Wat is het alternatief? 

Griekenland heeft naar schatting zeker al 240 miljard euro aan “noodsteun” ontvangen de voorbije vijf jaar. Niettemin was de Griekse schuldgraad nog nooit zo hoog: ze schommelt rond 180 procent van het BBP.

Dat is dan nog zonder de indirecte steun die de ECB aan de Griekse banken blijft verlenen. Er is een zogenaamde “slow-motion bank run” aan de gang. Grieken halen hun geld liever van de bank, wat de autoverkoop fors aanzwengelt. 32% van de activa in Griekse banken waren eind april afkomstig van leningen door de Griekse centrale bank en de ECB. In september was dat nog maar 12% en ondertussen is de bank run nog verergerd. Woensdag dient de ECB opnieuw te beslissen of en in welke mate ze de Griekse centrale bank toelaat om zelf euro’s te creëren om die aan de Griekse banken uit te lenen, via het zogenaamde mechanisme van “Emergency Liquidity Assistance” (ELA), normaal enkel bedoeld voor liquiditeitsproblemen. Hoe langer deze crisis duurt, hoe meer euro’s er via het Griekse bankensysteem worden gecreëerd. 

Biedt een Grexit zicht op beterschap? 

Een nieuwe zwakkere munt maakt exports, in de eerste plaats het toerisme, natuurlijk goedkoper, maar we mogen de voordelen daarvan niet overschatten. Het land heeft nu reeds maatregelen genomen die de concurrentiekracht deels hebben hersteld.

Het echt grote voordeel van een Griekse exit uit de eurozone is dat Griekenland niet langer zo goedkoop zal kunnen lenen, iets wat een vergiftigd geschenk was. Voor Griekse banken, en dus ook voor de Griekse overheid en burgers, zullen de interestvoeten fors stijgen. Politici zullen de bevolking niet langer met een immense schuldenberg kunnen opzadelen. 

Is er besmettingsgevaar?

Hoewel we niet naïef mogen zijn over instabiliteit op korte termijn bij een “Grexit”, denken de meeste analisten dat het gevaar voor besmetting zich eerder op lange termijn situeert. Als een euroland in de toekomst in de problemen komt, zullen investeerders veel sneller speculeren dat er opnieuw een exit komt. Er zal dan dus meer geld nodig zijn om een land binnen de muntunie te houden.

Er dreigt echter ook besmettingsgevaar indien Griekenland een zoveelste steunpakket krijgt. Later dit jaar zijn er verkiezingen in Spanje en Portugal. Net die twee landen staan sterk weigerachtig tegen de Griekse eisen. Populistische partijen zouden er de wind in de zeilen krijgen indien de eurolanden nu toegeven aan de Grieken. Geldtransfers naar Griekenland zijn misschien nu nog te verkopen. Transfers naar elk euroland dat in de problemen komt zijn dat niet. De eurozone heeft misschien sowieso weinig kans om te overleven op lange termijn, maar zeker niet als men die radicale weg op gaat.

Geldtransfers en inmenging in binnenlands economisch bestuur zijn het recept waarmee de Europese landen de voorbije vijf jaar hebben geprobeerd om de eurocrisis te lijf te gaan. Alvast voor Griekenland heeft dit recept gefaald. Eurofederalisten zien niettemin hun kans schoon om nog maar eens voor meer transfers en meer inmenging te pleiten. Het protest daartegen neemt echter toe, in Noord-Europa tegen het eerste, en in Zuid-Europa tegen het tweede. Het lage rentebeleid van de ECB en de Europese noodleningen vormen een hoge kost voor spaarders, verzekeringsmaatschappijen, gepensioneerden en belastingbetalers. Volgens de Duitse vice-Kanselier en SPD-leider Sigmar Gabriel “is de schaduw van een Griekse exit uit de eurozone meer en meer zichtbaar.” Wat niet voor altijd kan doorgaan, moet wel stoppen.