The EU risks squandering its last chance to do a deal with Britain

Published on The Telegraph

When it comes to EU negotiations, it is becoming ever clearer that the political consequences of the Supreme Court's ruling on Boris Johnson’s prorogation of Parliament are not particularly significant. Yes, it means that MPs have only lost two weeks, instead of five, to try to influence Brexit. But, more importantly, Parliament can’t really agree on much.

There is no support, at least not yet, for any of the alternatives: a Brexit deal, allowing “no deal”, revoking article 50, an early election or a second referendum. Boris Johnson may have lost his majority, but there isn’t an alternative one ready to replace his government. There is only a majority for extending UK membership, something that doesn't settle anything.

The EU must really consider carefully whether it wants to waste the upcoming month in the hope that Boris is deposed, opening the way for either a “softer Brexit” or the reversal of Brexit altogether. The latter is something many in the EU now realise is unsustainable, given how difficult the UK would be as a partner, not least due to the 17.4 million voters that would feel betrayed.

Given that Boris Johnson may also adopt a much more radical position on Brexit in the event of an election, in order to gain votes from the Brexit party, the EU would do well to realise a deal with him now is likely to be much easier rather than one later.

Boris has been moderating his position, most notably by suggesting an all-Ireland agri-food zone, which would increase the number of checks on UK territory, in the Irish Sea. He has however refused to align Northern Ireland to the EU’s customs territory, as this would mean intra-UK customs checks. Instead he has proposed things like trusted trader schemes and technology as a means to soften the border. The EU considers this to be a big obstacle.  

Boris Johnson still wants to preserve the Good Friday Agreement, but by minimising border checks instead of avoiding them altogether. This has lead to EU accusations that he was no longer committed to the "frictionless" trade Theresa May signed up to but only to trade that was "as frictionless as possible".

As a European diplomat put it: “His proposals presuppose the management of a border . . . not the avoidance of a hard border, as was the clear commitment between the EU and the previous UK government.”

The UK and the EU also seem to define what constitutes a “border” in a different way. Whereas the UK only sees it as a geographical frontier, the EU takes a wider view encompassing the all-island economy, thereby also defining checks away from the frontier as a border. 

The backstop is intended to protect the “Good Friday Agreement” and because of this, many equate it with this important peace accord, but as a new Open Europe briefing highlights, this is fundamentally mistaken. The backstop does not meet the same tests for cross-community consent as the Good Friday Agreement. Nationalists support it but most unionists oppose it.

The backstop may on the contrary undermine the already weak institutions established under the agreement, as there are major doubts that it respects the important “Principle of Consent” in the Good Friday Agreement that any fundamental changes to Northern Ireland’s governance must enjoy support among both communities.

The key difference between Boris Johnson and Theresa May is that the former is much keener for the UK to have an independent trade policy. Theresa May’s team seemed much more relaxed about this not materialising, by signing up to the backstop arrangement, which puts Brussels in charge of UK trade policy.

Given that Boris is set on an independent trade policy and therefore tariff differences, which will necessitate some checks, this means that for a deal, “European leaders will have to make a difficult shift in the negotiating red line of having no regulatory friction on the border at all. That is a big ask” an EU source tells The Times.

That is the case, to be fair, but surely asking for the UK to sacrifice an independent trade policy until further notice isn’t exactly a modest demand either.

There is, however, cause for optimism, as the EU has been moving too, even though one needs a microscope to see it. For a start, there was the EU’s willingness to grant Ireland some slack on border checks in case of "no deal”, at least for a while. That’s good news, as it is sometimes forgotten that it’s Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium that are going to ask Ireland to protect the EU’s external border after Brexit, while Boris Johnson has pledged that “under no circumstances (…) will the (…) United Kingdom be putting checks on the Northern Irish frontier.”

Secondly, given how leaky the EU’s external border is, it would be weird if Ireland were to come under intense pressure to deliver a perfectly protected border from those countries that fail in exactly that.

We are talking here about Greek customs facing more than €200 million in fines for failing to act against a major Chinese fraud network dumping ultra-cheap clothing and footwear in Europe. And about the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, those major gateways to the EU’s internal market, which are “leaking like a sieve”, according to Antwerp’s mayor.

On this, we can spot some movement, as there were some rumours about tolerating the same lacklustre VAT collection in Northern Ireland as elsewhere in the EU.

But apart from this glimmer of hope, nothing is moving on the EU side. EU negotiators have dismissed most UK demands for flexibility, which ultimately come down to tolerating a few extra holes in the external border, for the sake of peace. One such demand was to exempt small traders from being checked at the border.

Even if Ireland would move on the backstop, flexibility from Ireland’s EU partners in tolerating a border that is at least as leaky as the EU’s external border elsewhere will be absolutely crucial in order to come to a deal.

If Juncker is not just being diplomatic when stating that he thinks Boris is intent on a deal, he should realise the EU will need to move. In one month, “dealmaker” Boris may be replaced with “no deal Boris”. To quote EU negotiator Michel Barnier: “The clock is ticking”.  

Green activists need to give nuclear energy a chance if they really want to tackle CO2 emissions

Published by The Independent 

Last month, a report by Germany’s Green party concluded that 18 nuclear power plants in the European Union are operating without having been subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The conclusions were meant to suggest that the EU’s NPPs are unsafe. However, not only is an EIA a legal requirement that is only required in certain circumstances, it is entirely unrelated to safety.

To address safety considerations, there are bespoke EU stress tests along with national appraisals. However, headline-grabbing news – like the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) recent ruling that a 2015 decision to extend the life of two Belgian nuclear power plants by 10 more years was unlawful because Brussels failed to conduct EIAs – effectively serves to undermine popular support of nuclear power.

That the Belgian greens reacted to the ECJ ruling by stating that “the energy transition towards renewable energy must now be accelerated” indicates greens remain deeply skeptical of nuclear power, while championing renewables. But even in the green movement, the tide is turning.

According to the International Energy Agency, nuclear energy is the second-largest low-carbon power source in the world today, accounting for 10 per cent of global electricity generation. That’s only second to hydropower, which accounts for 16 per cent. It warns that without policy changes, advanced economies could lose 25 per cent of their nuclear capacity by 2025 and as much as two-thirds of it by 2040. If you’re worried about CO2 levels, that’s bad news. Without nuclear power, emissions from electricity generation would have been almost 20 per cent higher between 1971 and 2018, according to the IEA.

Despite policy changes in countries like Germany and Belgium, 50 new nuclear reactors are currently being constructed around the globe (15 of which are in China alone), and new technologies are constantly being developed. Take small modular reactors (SMRs), which are much safer thanks to their reliance on “passive”, less energy-consuming systems. Companies as diverse as NuScale Power, Rolls-Royce and China National Nuclear Corp. (CNNC) are betting on their success.

And therein lies the rub: while many proponents of renewables and battery technology point at how future technological development will sort out their many shortcomings, very few assume technological progress is possible for nuclear technology. On the contrary, innovations are routinely dismissed out of hand and painted as dangerous.

Case in point is the the Akademik Lomonosov floating nuclear power plant, which Greenpeace dubbed “Chernobyl on ice” a bid to play up fears about it before it even set off from Murmansk to Russia’s arctic region. That scaremongering ignores the fact the plant is meant to replace a coal-fired power plant and an ageing nuclear power plant, eliminating about half a million tons of CO2 emissions per year.

While the Lomonosov is the first of its kind, nuclear reactors have been going to sea since 1955, ever since the first nuclear-powered submarine, the USS Nautilus set off. It’s no surprise then that Finland's Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) has declared that the transport of Akademik Lomonosov along the Gulf of Finland “will not pose any concern”.

Against this backdrop of skepticism towards nuclear energy, it’s important to look at how environmentally friendly and economically efficient renewables are. The production of solar panels and wind turbines requires hazardous materials and – unlike in the case of nuclear waste – there are no proper plans on how to deal with these by-products, which are expected to hit 78 million metric tonnes by 2050.

In a special report on Germany’s 2011 decision to phase out nuclear energy, Der Spiegel notes that the “greatest political project undertaken since Germany's reunification, is facing failure”. The magazine notes how “most of the electricity that Germany needs is still produced by burning coal.'' It adds that “technologically speaking, it's possible to make the energy system free of fossil fuels by 2050,” but that it could cost Germany up to “€3.4 trillion”. This, after German electricity prices have already gone through the roof in recent years.

According to the magazine, “there is hardly a wind energy project that is not fought”, with citizens wary of electrical transmission towers pushing politicians to bury electrical lines “underground”, which is “many times more expensive and takes years longer.” As a result, the magazine concludes that “the wind power boom is over”.

What’s more, Germany’s decision was a kneejerk reaction to the Fukushima disaster in Japan, a move that was not endorsed by all environmentalists. One of the UK’s most respected environmental activists, George Monbiot, wrote that “as a result of the disaster at Fukushima, I am no longer nuclear-neutral. I now support the technology”, explaining that this really amounted to the ultimate test for nuclear power: “A crappy old plant with inadequate safety features was hit by a monster earthquake and a vast tsunami.[…] Yet, as far as we know no one has yet received a lethal dose of radiation”, a figure revised by the Japanese government to 1 last year.

As always in politics, it’s never black and white. A fair debate must involve taking into account the pros and cons of all energy sources. It also means examining both the present and future potential of a technology to respond to the world’s energy challenges. And with all things considered, nuclear energy deserves a fairer chance.

This may well be the EU’s last chance to avoid a no-deal Brexit. But will they take it?

Published in The Daily Telegraph

Boris Johnson's future as PM may hinge on whether he can avoid having to request a three-month extension, as required by legislation passed by a majority in Parliament. As this newspaper has reported, the Tory leader has drawn up plans to “sabotage” any Brexit extension by “send[ing] an accompanying letter alongside the request to extend Article 50 setting out that the Government does not want any delay after October 31”.

The EU will require the UK to “indicate a way forward” as a condition to granting an extension. Therefore, the UK hopes Brussels will automatically reject London's “request”, if it deliberately fails to present a concrete reason for the extension.

Legal challenges in the UK may hamper this strategy - a judge may, for example, rule that such conduct would violate the Benn legislation that forces Boris Johnson to request an extension. EU leaders might also still grant the extension, claiming that they believe a general election to be imminent, given the fact that Boris Johnson no longer has a majority. The latter would certainly be unprecedented, but these are unprecedented times.

Moreover, Brussels may now be strategising on the basis that, if they grant an extension, a Labour government, intent on stopping a no deal Brexit, could well come to power - and such a situation may work to Brussels' advantage.

One scenario they might envisage is Labour gaining power in December, perhaps propped up by other opposition parties. This would then be followed by yet another extension of UK membership, followed by a referendum where the British people would be able to vote between remaining in the EU and agreeing to a Labour-style Brexit deal, with likely more alignment than the deal Theresa May negotiated.

Crucially, Brussels is also very anxious to avoid no deal. It is true that France is threatening not to grant an extension, but - as was the case with the extension granted in Spring - this is more a game of trying to extract concessions such as the length of the extension period. Unlike last spring, President Macron no longer fears that the UK’s membership would affect the outcome of the European Parliament elections. 

Most importantly, France and other EU member states will be wary about any action that brings about a no deal against the wishes of Ireland. The latter's Minister for Finance Paschal Donohue stated today that Ireland “would be in favour of an extension that would create the space to hopefully conclude where we are”. It’s well-known that the country isn’t ready to deal with a hard border, even if the EU has now made clear it will tolerate holes in that border at least for a while.

Other European countries will be just as eager to avoid no deal. Insiders in the Port of Rotterdam admit that they’re not ready for a WTO Brexit,  as customs officers, inspection posts and lorry spaces are lacking. The Federation of German Industries (BDI) has warned a no deal Brexit would cause Germany's already weak growth to tumble to zero this year.  Never mind that this is the same BDI which trumpeted right after Boris Johnson entered office that “The Withdrawal Agreement must not be renegotiated.” In other words, the stars are aligned for an extension.

The EU should not, however, waste the time between now and 18 October by simply waiting for the extension. These may be the last weeks for them to avert a "no deal" Brexit. Extending Article 50 does not automatically stop no deal. With Boris Johnson, the EU have “the Devil they know”.  What if an extension is followed by a general election, in which Boris Johnson is obliged to back no deal in order to forge an alliance with the Brexit Party? What if the Conservatives win an absolute majority based on those pledges, and also because Boris Johnson has stepped down just before the extension, "sacrificing" his job for Brexit? These are now very real possibilities.

Therefore, the EU might want to look more seriously into what Mr Johnson is offering now. It’s hard to accuse Mr Johnson of not wanting a deal. Although the PM has moved on food checks in the Irish Sea, the EU and the Irish government have not softened their positions; they are still simply repeating that they are open to the idea of going back to the original Northern Ireland-only backstop. Some UK commentators have pointed out that due to the loss of a majority, the DUP are now “irrelevant” to Boris, so an Irish Sea border of some sort may therefore be easier. 

This may well be the EU’s last chance for a deal-based Brexit. But will they take it?

Mijn interview over #Brexit in De Zevende Dag:

De EU wil enkel een brexitakkoord als het VK een keuze maakt tussen het uitbesteden van zijn eigen handelsbeleid tot nader order, of anders douanecontroles organiseert op eigen grondgebied (tussen NI en GB):

Wat Brussel niet heeft begrepen van de brexit

Published in Belgian daily De Morgen and in the magazine of Dutch think tank Clingendael

Het wordt alsmaar moeilijker om tot een brexitakoord te komen. Een van de redenen is dat velen in Europa de Britse standpunten eenvoudigweg niet goed begrijpen. Hier zijn vier belangrijke misvattingen die vaak onuitgesproken blijven, maar het denken over brexit op het vasteland wel domineren en daarmee een akkoord bemoeilijken.

1. DE BRITTEN NEMEN EEN RIGIDE STANDPUNT IN

Men kan veel zeggen van de Britse premier Boris Johnson, maar zijn regering wenst nog te onderhandelen om zo een voor beide zijden pijnlijke no deal te vermijden. De EU weigerde sinds november, toen Johnsons voorganger Theresa May een uittredingsakkoord sloot met de EU, om het bindende deel van dat akkoord te onderhandelen, ook al waarschuwde May de Europese leiders toen uitdrukkelijk dat ze er misschien niet in zou slagen om haar parlement te overtuigen. Pas verleden week maakten Macron en Merkel een eerste bocht: de letter van dat bindende deel kan wel worden gewijzigd, zolang er maar onmiddellijk werkbare alternatieven zijn om een harde grens in Noord-Ierland te vermijden.

2. HET BRITSE VERZET TEGEN HET UITTREDINGSAKKOORD IS IRRATIONEEL

Zoals ondertussen bekend is, weigerde het Britse parlement tot driemaal toe om het brexitakkoord goed te keuren omwille van de zogenaamde backstop die erin is voorzien. Die voorziening houdt in dat het VK de handelstarieven van de EU overneemt, tot op het punt dat de EU en in het bijzonder Ierland zich akkoord verklaren met controles op handelstarieven aan de Ierse grens die een harde grens vermijden. Theresa May stemde hiermee in omdat de EU in feite stelde dat een brexitakkoord enkel mogelijk is onder een voorwaarde: dat het VK, de vijfde grootste economie ter wereld, een keuze maakt tussen dit uitbesteden van zijn eigen handelsbeleid tot nader order, of als alternatief douanecontroles organiseert op zijn eigen grondgebied, in de Ierse Zee, tussen Noord-Ierland en Groot-Brittannië. Het akkoord met de EU schendt trouwens het Goedevrijdagakkoord dat vrede bracht in Noord-Ierland, aldus Nobelprijs-winnaar David Trimble, een van de leiders van de partijen die dit akkoord sloten.

3. HET VK ZIT NIET ZO IN MET EU-BURGERS

Velen, inclusief Theresa May, interpreteerden brexit als een uiting van antimigratiesentiment, maar peilingen wijzen uit dat dit niet zo is en dat men in de eerste plaats migratie beter wil kunnen controleren. Dat werd duidelijk toen de nieuwe minister van Binnenlandse Zaken onlangs liet weten dat er in geval van no deal onmiddellijk een einde zou komen aan het vrije personenverkeer. Ze werd meteen teruggefloten. De Britse regering wil dit alles geleidelijk veranderen, ook omdat Boris Johnson zelf nogal positief staat ten opzichte van migratie.

Ook stelde de Britse regering al voor aan de EU om de rechten van de meer dan drie miljoen Europese burgers in het VK en die van de Britse burgers in de EU te regelen in een aparte overeenkomst, in het geval er geen uittredingsakkoord zou zijn. Maar de EU weigerde dit.

4. HET VK GEEFT NIET OM EEN HARDE GRENS IN NOORD-IERLAND

Noord-Ierland maakt tot nader order nog altijd deel uit van het VK en nieuwe spanningen daar zouden het VK dus nog meer treffen dan Ierland. De Noord-Ierse DUP stelde trouwens als minimumeis tijdens de onderhandelingen met May om haar regering te ondersteunen dat er geen harde grens in Ierland mocht komen. Het is wel zo dat die partij nog meer belang hecht aan het vermijden van controles in de Ierse Zee, tussen Noord-Ierland en het Britse vasteland.

Johnson suggereerde net deze week om Noord-Ierland de EU-voedselstandaarden te laten volgen, wat dus controles in de Ierse Zee noodzakelijk maakt. Hij is dus bereid om compromissen te sluiten om een harde Ierse grens te vermijden, ook al zien de unionisten dit met lede ogen aan. Ondertussen weigert de Ierse regering elke flexibiliteit, ook al zou een no deal naast grote economische schade voor Ierland en zijn EU-partners (zoals ons land) ook tot spanningen kunnen leiden met die andere EU-lidstaten. België, Nederland, Frankrijk en Duitsland willen dat Ierland grenscontroles gaat uitvoeren na de brexit. Dit om de Europese douanegrens te beschermen, ook al zijn onze eigen havens, althans die van Antwerpen en Rotterdam, “zo lek als een vergiet”, aldus de Antwerpse burgemeester.

Boris Johnson daarentegen stelt dat hij helemaal geen grenscontroles wil in Noord-Ierland. Misschien is er dus toch dringend een andere kijk op het brexitvraagstuk nodig.